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“It is by my order and for the good of the state that the
bearer has done what has been done.”
Cardinal Richelieu, in The Three Musketeers 
by Alexandre Dumas
In the largely liberal circles in which I, and most other
academic scientists, travel there is a perception that the present
US government is slowly eroding - or at any rate would like to
erode if it thought it could get away with it - many of our basic
civil liberties. There is also the concern that, eventually, in the
name of ‘national security’ or ‘the war on terrorism’, ‘they’ will
be allowed to get away with it, because the public is afraid.
Regardless of one’s politics, we can probably all agree that
people are more fearful than they were, say, ten years ago, but I
don’t think it’s just terrorism that the public is afraid of.
Another big component of this swelling fear is the rapidly
accelerating pace of scientific and technological progress.
The unknown usually provokes anxiety, and the closer the
unknown comes to touching us directly the greater the
anxiety becomes. Recent advances in biology and medicine,
from the sequence of the human genome to the cloning of
mammals to the engineering of bacteria and viruses for
biowarfare as well as for therapeutic purposes, have made
many lay people profoundly uneasy about the future of
humanity. In this climate of unease, the public seems willing
to accept restrictions on many things, including science.
President Bush’s decision to limit the supply of stem cells
available for medical research was one such restriction. 
In an attempt to forestall more of them, on 9 October 2003 a
panel convened by the National Research Council (NRC), a
component of the US National Academy of Sciences, recom-
mended voluntary prior review, at both the university and
federal levels, of experiments in seven areas of genetics, bio-
chemistry and microbiology. These areas were chosen
because they represent types of research that could conceiv-
ably provide terrorists or hostile nations with information or
material useful for the creation of biological weapons.
The proposal from the panel, which was headed by yeast
geneticist Gerry Fink of the Whitehead Institute (Cambridge,
USA), calls for self-regulation by scientists through a review
process that would operate at several levels. The first is local:
rather than the creation of a new machinery, it recommends
using the existing system of institutional biosafety review
committees, which already must approve any research that
involves genetically engineered organisms or ones deemed
hazardous, such as human pathogens. These local review
boards are meant to ensure that experiments are conducted
in a manner that protects the scientists involved and the
community in which they work. In the Fink panel’s proposal,
these committees would also be given the additional job of
issuing, or withholding, approval for projects whose results
might conceivably be misused by terrorist organizations or
rogue states. 
As a second tier, the report proposed that rulings of the local
committee could be appealed to the federal Recombinant
DNA Advisory Committee (RAC), a body set up by the
National Institutes of Health in the late 1970s as a result of
public concern about the possible release into the environ-
ment of genetically modified organisms produced by recombi-
nant DNA technology. The RAC would also serve as a resource
for local committees that were unable to come to a decision.
Perhaps the most important suggestion of the NRC panel was
the creation of a final level of review, a new advisory commit-
tee for the Department of Health and Human Services - note,
not the Department of Homeland Security - involving both
biologists and security experts that would coordinate the sci-
entific aspects of biodefense across many different federal
agencies. This committee would help to ensure that scientific
information was properly taken into account in any decisions
involving the possible misuse of biological research. 
A key element of the proposed system of self-regulation is
that it would be entirely voluntary. The Fink panel, which
consisted of lawyers, public policy experts and former high-
ranking security officials as well as scientists, agreed thatpeer pressure and the humanity of most scientists would be
enough to ensure compliance. Although the report focused
on research carried out in universities and medical schools,
the Fink panel also recommended that pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies submit voluntarily to such prior
review as well.
What about research that was approved but whose findings
might later be deemed by some to constitute a risk? Signifi-
cantly, no specific restrictions on the publication of com-
pleted research results were proposed. I think this is a wise
decision. Most biological research - with the exception of the
seven areas specified in the report (which include, for
example, experiments aimed at engineering microbes to
avoid the human immune system) - has great potential bene-
fits for human health as well as a small possibility of misuse.
Given that, in biology especially, those who make a discovery
are almost never those who eventually turn it into some
practical application, widespread dissemination of research
findings is essential for those benefits to be realized. 
By these recommendations, life scientists have taken the
lead in trying to prevent dangerous research from being
carried out in the first place - a policy more sensible, and less
erosive of liberty, than censorship of publication (which, as
the panel notes, is unlikely to prevent others from learning
about it anyway). The Fink panel’s report attempted to strike
a balance between the need to reassure a public that is
increasingly anxious and suspicious about biological
research and the desire of scientists to avoid excessive gov-
ernment intrusion into their freedom to conduct that
research. The stem cell debacle is a good illustration of why
scientists are right to believe that the present US govern-
ment, in particular, may wish to restrict some research for
purely political or religious reasons, and might try to use the
public’s fear of bioterrorism to aid in doing so. 
Few forms of human endeavor depend as much on freedom -
freedom of thought, inquiry, action and communication - as
does basic scientific research. Unlike applied research, basic
research is conducted largely to satisfy the curiosity of the
individual investigator. Yet it is from just such research that
nearly all breakthroughs emerge. The best-selling anti-cancer
drug, cisplatin, was discovered serendipitously in a basic
research project studying not cancer but bacteria (see
Genome Biology 2001,  3:comment1001.1-1001.2), and the
entire biotechnology industry is based on a series of discover-
ies by molecular biologists and biochemists who were study-
ing bacterial processes that everyone, including themselves,
thought had no practical significance. It is not a coincidence
that those countries that lead in the advancement of knowl-
edge and the creation of new industries from that knowledge
are also the world’s most free. Although the panel’s recom-
mendations will strike some scientists as starting biology out
on the slippery slope to governmental control, and others as
not going far enough to keep our discoveries out of the hands
of would-be bioterrorists, I believe they are a measured and
appropriate response to the twin threats of misuse of science
and government interference. 
In The Three Musketeers, Cardinal Richelieu gives one of his
agents a letter that excuses any act of villainy, even murder,
as being for the good of the state. In a fine piece of irony, this
letter falls into the hands of D’Artagnan, who uses it to
escape the Cardinal’s vengeance for having helped to kill that
same agent. Likewise, the umbrella of ‘national security’ or
‘the war on terrorism’ can, ironically, be used to shelter the
very abuses that it is meant to protect us from: repression
and tyranny. Thus are our swords, as Brutus says at the end
of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar (another tale of patriotic
impulses gone wrong) sometimes turned “into our own
proper entrails.” 
Voluntary restrictions, when no longer needed, are usually
easily lifted; but when a government takes freedoms away it
is much harder to regain them. I believe that many of those
who would impose censorship and restrict our liberties do so
with the best intentions. But one of the things that history
teaches is that some of the worst things imaginable have
been done with the best intentions. It makes it even harder
to bear, if one loves one’s country, that such actions are
carried out by other patriotic people for the good of the state.
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